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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Fifth Amendment - Judicial
Comment on Failure to Testify Allowed. Lakeside v.
Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978). In Lakeside v. Oregon' the
Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally permissible for
a trial court to instruct the jury, over the objection of defense
counsel, not to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's
failure to testify. The decision should be compared with the
Court's holding in Griffin v. California2 that a defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated
when the jury was advised, either by the court or the prosecu-
tion, that it could draw adverse inferences from the defendant's
silence. The instruction used in Lakeside, however, was held
not to violate the privilege. Therefore, the Lakeside decision
raises two questions: (1) Whether and to what extent it is con-
sistent with the decision in Griffin; and, (2) what implications
it has for the permissibility of the type of comment involved
in Griffin. This note will compare Lakeside with Griffin in an
attempt to answer these questions.
I.
Prior to Malloy v. Hogan,3 the issue was largely academic.
In the first instance, under the common law in force at the time
of the adoption of the fifth amendment, a criminal defendant
was not a competent witness.' Thereafter, when Congress legis-
lated to remove a defendant's incompetency,5 the legislation
explicitly provided that defendant's failure to take advantage
of his newly granted competency should not create any pre-
sumptions against him. The Court construed that provision
1. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
2. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
3. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (which made the right not to incriminate oneself applicable
to the states).
4. 1 J. WIMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 597, at 1008 (2d ed. 1923).
See Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify, 31 MICH. L. REV. 40, 41,
42-43 n.20 (1932-1933).
5. The first such legislation was the Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30.
6. The current version is at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970) and reads as follows:
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the
United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in
any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own
request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a request shall not
create any presumption against him.
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in Wilson v. United States7 as barring any unfavorable com-
ment concerning the defendant's silence. Since the question of
the permissibility of such comment was covered by statute,
there was no need for the courts to consider whether the same
would be required by the fifth amendment itself.8
In state courts, the question was no less academic since, in
Twining v. New Jersey,9 the Court had held.that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination would not be
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.'0 The propriety of comment was thus left to be deter-
mined by the states and all but six, by statute, case law or
constitution, prohibited such comment."
Prior to Malloy, the scope of protections afforded a de-
fendant in a state trial was analyzed in terms of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 2 Initially, the Court ap-
plied a limited standard to determine which of those privileges
and immunities were extended through the due process clause.
In Twining, for example, it was held that, before a right would
be so extended, it had to be of the very essence of national
government; 13 under that standard, even concededly funda-
mental rights could be denied incorporation." Subsequent to
Twining, the process of selective incorporation of Bill of Rights
guarantees proceeded apace." Then, in Palko v. Connecticut,8
7. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
8. The analysis in Wilson dealt solely with the requirements of the statute, without
referring to the fifth amendment. Id. at 66. Section 3481 applied only to federal courts,
of course.
9. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
10. Id. at 99. Twining was followed in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51
(1947).
11. The six states in which comment was permitted were: California-CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 13; Connecticut-State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929); Iowa-State
v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 283 N.W. 917 (1939); New Jersey-Parker v. State, 61
N.J.L. 308, 39 A. 651 (1898); New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-19 (1964) (re-
pealed by supreme court order effective July 1, 1972); Ohio-Omo CONST. art. I, § 10.
See Note, Comment and Inference Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 25
OHIO ST. L.J. 578, 581-84 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Coment Under the Fifth
Amendment].
12. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), had, of course, pre-
cluded the application of all federal privileges and immunities, as enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, to state court defendants.
13. 211 U.S. at 97-99.
14. Id. at 97.
15. In the years between Twining and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937),
the Court had incorporated the following Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth
amendment: (1) Sixth amendment right to counsel, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
19781
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which was decided almost thirty years after Twining, the Court
broadened the standard by which it would determine which
rights were incorporated. The standard formulated in that case
required that those rights which were "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty"'7 would be so incorporated. How-
ever, the point at which the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was considered such a right had not yet been
reached. 8
In refusing to incorporate the privilege, the Palko Court
said, "Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that
a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without . . . [the immunity from compulsory self-
incrimination]."19
This reasoning, of course, made it unnecessary for the Court
to determine, in the context of comment on the defendant's
failure to testify, what purposes the privilege served; such for-
mulation was left for academic development. Wigmore, for ex-
ample, stressed two significant purposes:
The first is to remove the right to an answer in the hard cores
of instances where compulsion might lead to inhumanity, the
principal inhumanity being abusive tactics by a zealous ques-
tioner .... The second is to comply with the prevailing
ethic that the individual is sovereign and that proper rules of
battle between government and individual require that the
individual not be bothered for less than good reason and not
be conscripted by his opponent to defeat himself .... 0
Comment on the defendant's failure to testify was seen as con-
sistent with the first of these purposes. The jury, after all, was
bound to notice that the defendant had not testified. 2' There-
fore, it was reasoned that, left to its own devices, the jury would
treat the defendant's silence as a virtual admission of guilt.
(1932); (2) first amendment freedom of religion, Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245
(1934); (3) first amendment freedom of the press, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1935); (4) first amendment freedom of speech, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937). See 70 DICK. L. REv. 98, 105 n.60 (1965).
16. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
17. Id. at 325.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251, at 318 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). See also Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RrOEas L. REV.
541, 547-49 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Clapp]; 83 HARV. L. REv. 648, 655-56 (1970).
21. See Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify,
31 MICH. L. REv. 226, 230 (1932-1933) [hereinafter cited as Bruce].
.[Vol. 62:74
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Thus, it would be in defendant's best interest if the jury were
told that it could draw reasonable inferences, but no more,
from the defendant's silence.
Far from being considered inhumane, such comment was
thought to be for defendant's benefit. Convinced that the first
of these purposes controlled, and that comment was perfectly
consistent therewith, one writer stated categorically:
All that was in the minds of the framers of the constitutional
provisions was the desire to prevent injustice and direct com-
pulsion. Theirs was a protest against and a fear of the inquisi-
tion of torture . . . . Their protest was against compulsion
and not against the reasonable inferences which might be
drawn from voluntary acts or from the use of one's volition
in refraining from acting."
Wigmore's second purpose was largely ignored since the Court
had not stressed the significance of that purpose.?
II.
In Malloy, the privilege against self-incrimination was ap-
plied to the states; the Court overruled Twining and Adamson
in the process. But the Court was forced to do more: it was
forced to clearly enunciate fifth amendment requirements as
applied to the federal government and the states. This was so
because the majority found it necessary to deal with the con-
tentions contained in the dissent written by Justice White. He
reasoned that, while incorporation of the fifth amendment was
mandated, the privilege against self-incrimination had not
been violated in Malloy.24
When called as a witness before a grand jury in Hartford,
Connecticut, Malloy invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination; as a result, he was jailed for contempt. The
Court, therefore, had to deal not only with the question of
whether the privilege could be invoked at all in a state proceed-
ing, but, if so, with the proper standards for determining
whether the privilege was properly invoked by Malloy.
22. Id. at 233.
23. The significance of that purpose had previously been recognized by Justice
Cardozo when he stated in Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, -, 177 N.E. 489, 491
(1931) that the privilege against self-incrimination "is a barrier interposed between the
individual and the power of the government, a barrier interposed by the sovereign
people of the state; and neither legislators nor judges are free to overleap it."
24. 378 U.S. at 33-38 (White, J., dissenting).
1978]
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In overruling Twining the Court held that the basis for its
earlier refusal to extend the privilege against self-incrimination
to state proceedings had been eroded by subsequent decisions.
First, in Brown v. Mississippi5 the Court had invalidated a
conviction based upon a coerced confession. In that decision,
however, the Court had been careful to emphasize that its hold-
ing was not rested upon the fifth amendment privilege; rather,
the Court used general fourteenth amendment principles to
hold that "[c]ompulsion by torture to extort a confession is a
different matter. '2 6
Later, in Lisenba v. California,27 the Court found that in a
state proceeding a defendant had a "free choice to admit, to
deny, or to refuse to answer. 128 This was found to be substan-
tially identical to the federal standard, enunciated in Bram v.
United States,29 by which the admissibility of a confession in
federal court would be determined by whether it was" 'free and
voluntary: that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied prom-
ises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influ-
ence . . . .' " The Malloy Court, therefore, felt compelled to
conclude that "the same standards must determine whether an
accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justi-
fied," 31 and that the notion has been rejected that "the Four-
teenth Amendment applies to the States only a 'watered-down,
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.' ",32
The amendment was characterized by the Malloy Court as
the essential mainstay of the American system of criminal
prosecution, which is accusatorial, not inquisitorial33 in its na-
ture. It therefore was said to guarantee "the right of a person
to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such
25. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
26. Id. at 285. The general supervisory powers of the Court, found in the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, was the stated basis for the decision.
27. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
28. Id. at 241.
29. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
30. Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 W. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
478 (9th ed. 1877).
31. 378 U.S. at 11.
32. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
33. 378 U.S. at 7.
[Vol. 62:74
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silence." 34 The Court's emphasis was clearly upon the free will
of the individual and his autonomy vis-a-vis the state. This was
brought into even sharper focus when the standard was applied
to the particular facts in Malloy. In choosing whether the peti-
tioner's or the Court's determination of the incriminatory na-
ture of the questions was to control, the Court held that the
fifth amendment required that the individual's determination
supersede; upon his invocation of the privilege, "the judge
must be 'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and
that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to
incriminate" 35 in order to deny it.
In the Malloy Court's view, then, the individual must be
given the benefit of every doubt. This is a reflection of Wig-
more's conception of the second purpose of privilege: the indi-
vidual's freedom must not be disturbed for less than good rea-
son.3" Malloy makes it apparent that such good reason could
only be present when no doubt as to the bad faith of the de-
fendant in asserting the privilege could be found.37
This interpretation was strongly contested by Justice
White, in dissent:
While purporting to apply the prevailing federal standard of
incrimination . . .the Court has all but stated that a wit-
ness' invocation of the privilege to any question is to be auto-
matically, and without more, accepted. With deference, I
prefer the rule permitting the judge rather than the witness
to determine when an answer sought is incriminating.3
In the opinion of Justices White and Stewart, the interest of the
individual in the absolute freedom to determine when he is
being compelled to incriminate himself should be balanced
against the interest of the state in the testimony of every citi-
zen.39 Since this balance would necessarily be upset by accord-
ing the individual absolute autonomy to determine when the
privilege is properly invoked, Justice White reasoned that the
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 12 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951)) (empha-
sis in original).
36. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
37. For examples of improper reasons for invoking the privilege, see Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. at 33-34.
38. Id. at 33 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart joined in Justice White's
dissent.
39. Id. at 34, 39-40.
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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
privilege would be adequately safeguarded were the court to
make a "meaningful determination" of the incriminatory na-
ture of defendant's proposed testimony.40
III.
After Malloy, it was still not clear that comment on de-
fendant's failure to testify would be barred by the fifth amend-
ment." The facts of Malloy, involving a witness before a grand
jury, could be distinguished from a situation in which the de-
fendant stood accused at a criminal trial; such a distinction
could be rested upon either of Wigmore's stated purposes.42
In Griffin, however, the Court dispelled all doubts as to the
applicability of Malloy in the context of comment on the de-
fendant's failure to testify. Petitioner was convicted of first
degree murder after a trial at which the prosecution made
much of his failure to testify, failing thereby to explain or rebut
evidence which placed him with the victim at the time of the
murder. The trial court carefully instructed the jury that it
could have reasonably expected the defendant to explain or
deny the incriminating evidence from facts within his own
knowledge, were he capable of doing so, but that his failure to
40. Id. at 34.
41. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417
(1965).
42. See text accompanying note 20 supra. See also Meltzer, Required Records, the
McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CH. L. REv. 687,
691-92 (1951) (contrasting a defendant's situation at trial with his situation during
police interrogation). See, e.g., Comment Under the Fifth Amendment, supra note 11,
at 593.
43. The text of the prosecutor's comments is set forth in Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 610-11 (1965). It provides an excellent example of the lengths to which
prosecutorial comment is capable of going:
The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appear-
ance at the time he left her apartment and went down the alley with her.
What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a woman that
beat up [sic] if she was beat up at the time he left?
He would know that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would
know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know
how long he was with her in that box. He would know how her wig got off. He
would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would know whether he
walked away from that place cool as a cucumber when he saw Mr. Villasenor
because he was conscious of his own guilt and wanted to get away from that
damaged or injured woman.
These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.
And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would know.
Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story. The defendant
won't.
[Vol. 62:74
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do so did not by itself create an inference of guilt or relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proof." The Court found that re-
versible error had been committed. To draw adverse inferences
from the defendant's silence, in the Court's view, was to ignore
other possible reasons for defendant's failure to testify.45
The Griffin Court also stressed that comment "is a penalty
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. it
cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."4
The trial judge may believe that the jury is bound to notice the
defendant's silence and to think the worst without any prod-
ding. But Griffin stands for the proposition that, if the de-
fendant feels that comment would work to his detriment, his
feelings in that regard must be respected. 7
It is submitted that to hold otherwise would be to subvert
the purpose of the privilege, which is to safeguard the individ-
ual's right to decide whether or not to testify. If the defendant
44. Id. at 610. The comments made by the prosecutor should be contrasted with
the instruction given by the trial court:
It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be
compelled to testify. Thus, whether or not he does testify rests entirely in his
own decision. As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can
reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge,
if he does not testify, or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain
such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to
indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences
that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are
the more probable. In this connection, however, it should be noted that if a
defendant does not have the knowledge that he would need to deny or to explain
any certain evidence against him, it would be unreasonable to draw an inference
unfavorable to him because of his failure to deny or explain such evidence. The
failure of a defendant to deny or explain evidence against him does not create a
presumption of guilt or by itself warrant an inference of guilt, nor does it relieve
the prosecution of its burden of proving every essential element of the crime and
the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 618.
This instruction was based upon CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13, which provided in part:
"[I]n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain
or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or
the jury." 380 U.S. at 617.
45. Among those reasons are the fear that his demeanor on the witness stand might
make an unfavorable impression on the jury, 380 U.S. at 613 (quoting Wilson v. United
States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)) and the fear that his record of prior convictions will be
brought out on cross-examination, 380 U.S. at 615 (quoting People v. Modesto, 62 Cal.
2d 436, 453, 398 P.2d 753, 763, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 427 (1965)). For a fuller discussion of
this point, see text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
46. 380 U.S. at 614.
47. Id. at 613.
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has decided that the advantages of not testifying outweigh the
risk that the jury will draw inferences against him, that is his
decision to make. The court should not be entitled to reweigh
that risk. As the Court observed, "What the jury may infer,
given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer
when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evi-
dence against him is quite another."4
Justice Stewart, in dissent, deemed it beyond all cavil that
the jury, left to its own devices, will convict the defendant from
his silence. 9 Therefore, Justice Stewart thought that the Court
could ignore defendant's wishes without abridging his fifth
amendment right not to incriminate himself."' Justice Stewart
thus adhered to the view of the dissenters in Malloy.
IV.
In Griffin, the jury was told that it could draw reasonable
adverse inferences from defendant's failure to testify. In
Lakeside, a trial court instruction, given despite defendant's
objection, directed the jury not to draw any adverse inferences
from that failure." The question of whether a situation such as
that present in Lakeside was governed by Griffin received vary-
ing treatment in the years between the two decisions.
Cases holding that a Lakeside situation was governed by
Griffin are exemplified by Russell v. State."2 In that case, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that "the instruction ought not
to be given against the wishes of the defendant. If the accused
is to have the unfettered right to testify or not to testify he
should have a correlative right to say whether or not his silence
should be singled out for the jury's attention."' ' This argument
lays stress on the fifth amendment purpose of safeguarding
48. Id. at 614.
49. Id. at 621 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 620. Justice Stewart's description of the fifth amendment is substantially
identical to that found in Bruce, supra note 21; the defendant is far better off having
the inferences to be drawn by the jury guided by "the limiting and carefully controlling
language of the instruction here involved [than he would be] if the jury were left to
roam at large, with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defend-
ant's silence broad inferences of guilt." 380 U.S. at 621 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The
determination is thereby made that such comment as is here involved is in the de-
fendant's best interests, and therefore has no incriminatory effect.
51. It had been well settled, at least in federal court, that such an instruction was
mandatory once requested by a defendant. See, e.g., Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S.
287 (1939).
52. 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966).
53. Id. at -, 398 S.W.2d at 215.
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individual autonomy, the purpose which was emphasized in
both Malloy and Griffin. Decisions taking the opposite view are
illustrated by State v. Dean,54 in which the Arizona Court of
Appeals said,
At the whim of the accused, an instruction which properly
states the law on the subject undergoes a monumental trans-
formation from a procedural safeguard required by the Con-
stitution to a noxious and abhorrent comment forbidden by
the very same Constitution. The only basis for this rather
startling metamorphosis is the subjective desire of the ac-
cused.5
With the issue thus joined, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Lakeside,5" and it would be difficult to conceive of a
more appropriate fact situation for the presentation of the
issue. Petitioner, charged with escape, had presented an insan-
ity defense. One must strain the imagination to conceive of a
situation in which an allegedly insane person could add to his
defense by testifying. Indeed, petitioner did not testify and any
mention of this fact was studiously avoided by defense counsel.
Nevertheless, the trial court, over defendant's objection, in-
structed the jury not to draw any adverse inferences from de-
fendant's silence.57
The matter fell into the hands of Justice Stewart, and the
outcome was predictable. Although careful to distinguish
Griffin,58 the Court in Lakeside made essentially the same ar-
guments as had been made in Justice Stewart's Griffin dissent.
Dismissing petitioner's contention that the instruction drew
the jury's attention to the defendant's silence, the Court stated
that such an argument
would require indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions:
First, that the jurors have not noticed that the defendant did
not testify and will not, therefore, draw adverse inferences on
their own. Second, that the jurors will totally disregard the
instruction, and affirmatively give weight to what they have
54. 8 Ariz. App. 508, 447 P.2d 890 (1968).
55. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 895. The Arizona and Arkansas decisions stand in
stark contrast: The Arizona court found unreasonable the very individual autonomy
stressed as a defendant's right by the Arkansas court.
56. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
57. Id. at 334.
58. Id. at 338-39.
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been told not to consider at all. Federal constitutional law
cannot rest on speculative assumptions so dubious as these.-9
In dissent, Justice Stevens dealt with the first of these
"doubtful assumptions" by pointing out that "the jury will
probably draw an unfavorable inference despite instructions to
the contrary. Although this 'cost' can never be eliminated,
Griffin stands for the proposition that the government may not
add unnecessarily to the risk taken by a defendant who stands
mute."60 In answer to the second assumption, the dissent of-
fered the following:
Even if jurors try faithfully to obey their instructions, the
connection between silence and guilt is often too direct and
too natural to be resisted. When the jurors have in fact over-
looked it, telling them to ignore the defendant's silence is like
telling them not to think of a white bear."
Justice Stewart characterized these assumptions as doubt-
ful; Malloy and Griffin said that the benefit of that doubt must
go to the defendant. Malloy required that defendant make his
choice as to whether or not to testify "in the unfettered exercise
of his own will,"'" and Griffin required that there be no
"penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional priv-
ilege." As one of the purposes of the fifth amendment privi-
lege is to safeguard the individual's autonomy, the determina-
tion of when a penalty is imposed is for the individual to make,
and not, as Justice Stewart has consistently argued, for the
trial court. Therefore, it appears that, despite Justice Stewart's
attempts, Lakeside and Griffin cannot be reconciled. 4
V.
Whether or not the Griffin rule will withstand Lakeside
remains to be seen. There is, of course, an obvious difference
in degree between the two types of comment; the interference
is certainly not as great in a Lakeside situation. However, there
may not be a difference in kind. What is needed is some sort
of principled distinction between the two types of comment for,
if none is found, and the Court in Lakeside has adopted a new
59. Id. at 340 (footnotes omitted).
60. Id. at 344.
61. Id. at 345.
62. 378 U.S. at 8.
63. 380 U.S. at 614.
64. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. at 344 n.3.
[Vol. 62:74
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principle inconsistent with Griffin, that is as much as to say
that Griffin has been overruled. Some basis must be found to
support Justice Stewart's contention that Lakeside involved
"'comment' of an entirely different order."65
It is not enough to say that the distinction lies in the fact
that the comment involved in Lakeside is clearly to the de-
fendant's benefit, whereas the comment involved in Griffin is
not; reasonable minds may differ about the truth of that propo-
sition. For example, Justice Stewart argued in Griffin that the
comment there involved merely had the effect of limiting, not
encouraging, the inference to be drawn by the jury." Further-
more, in Lakeside, as in Griffin, the defendant did not concur
in the evaluation of the comment as beneficial. If defendant's
assessment can be ignored in Lakeside, why not in Griffin as
well?
As mentioned earlier, 7 adverse inferences drawn from a de-
fendant's failure to testify may not always be warranted. A
defendant may have reasons to avoid testifying which bear no
relation to fear of exposing his guilt.
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand
though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive
timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to
explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences
charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him
to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices
against him."
Other reasons for refusing to testify include, inter alia, fear that
a record of prior convictions will be revealed upon cross-
examination, poor demeanor and hesitancy to implicate those
loved or feared.70 Thus a Griffin instruction can mislead the
jury; such danger is not presented by a Lakeside instruction
since it does not ask the jury to draw possibly unwarranted
inferences.
Of course, this is no more than an argument for requiring
the trial court to exercise discretion in giving a Griffin instruc-
65. Id. at 339.
66. 380 U.S. at 621.
67. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
68. See, e.g., Note, 70 DIcK. L. REv. 98, 116-17 (1965).
69. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
70. See Comment Under the Fifth Amendment, supra note 11, at 595 n.82, where
it is suggested that a possible reason for a defendant's reluctance to testify may be his
overt homosexuality.
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tion.7 ' In many, if not most, cases it will be clear that none of
these factors is present. Personable and articulate defendants
do exist; this argument says nothing that would bar the trial
court frqm giving such an instruction when faced with such a
defendant. Moreover, to the extent that a Lakeside instruction
pressures a defendant to give testimony, such an instruction
compels him to testify though he may have good reasons for not
doing so. Thus, a price is exacted for the exercise of the right
not to incriminate oneself.
It may, however, be incorrect to distinguish Lakeside from
Griffin by attempting to consistently apply any absolute prin-
ciple. Rather, perhaps what we are observing in Lakeside is a
process of balancing the competing interests of the state and
the individual. The roots of such a balancing process can be
traced as far back as United States v. Burr,7" in which Chief
Justice Marshall stated, "The principle which entitles the
United States to the testimony of every citizen, and the princi-
ple by which every witness is privileged not to accuse himself,
can neither of them be entirely disregarded. 7 3 Each state, as
well as the federal government, has an interest in assuring that
its criminal trials ascertain the truth. It, therefore, has an in-
terest in any light that may be shed by the testimony of any
witness, including the defendant. This interest obviously is at
loggerheads with the defendant's interest in being free from
compulsion to incriminate himself.
Chief Justice Marshall taught us that neither interest can
be held always to supersede the other; a proper balance must
be struck in each case. Justice Stewart expressed the same idea
in his dissenting opinion in Griffin when he stated, "Surely no
one would deny that the State has an important interest in
throwing the light of rational discussion on that which tran-
spires in the course of a trial, . . . to shape a legal process
designed to ascertain the truth."74
With this analysis, the difference in degree between the
comments in Lakeside and Griffin becomes significant. Al-
though both comments impose the same kind of cost upon the
defendant's decision not to testify, a Lakeside comment im-
poses that cost to a lesser degree. The jury is being told, after
71. See Clapp, supra note 20, at 556.
72. 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e).
73. Id. at 39-40.
74. 380 U.S. at 622.
[Vol. 62:74
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
all, not to draw an adverse inference; there is always the chance
that it may comply. When a Griffin comment is made, on the
other hand, there is no question but that the jury will draw at
least some adverse inference. The Lakeside holding may very
well stand for no more than the proposition that the balance is
to be struck in favor of the state because the cost to the de-
fendant is smaller.
In this way, Lakeside can also be reconciled with Brooks v.
Tennessee,'7 5 a case cited by the dissent as compelling a result
different from that reached by the majority. In that case the
Court invalidated a Tennessee law"6 which required that the
defendant must testify ahead of all other defense witnesses, if
at all. This rule was established to prevent the defendant, who
could not be sequestered,77 from molding his testimony to fit
that of other defense witnesses. A defendant who planned to
testify but who found, after the presentation of all other evi-
dence, that his testimony was unnecessary would have been
compelled by that law to testify where otherwise he would not.
In Brooks, the Court found that law violative of the fifth
amendment privilege; the dissent in Lakeside argued that if
the compelling state interest in preventing perjury did not out-
weigh the privilege in Brooks, then in Lakeside, where no state
interest was clearly identified, the privilege should certainly be
capable of successful assertion. 8 The answer to that argument
is that the state interest involved in Lakeside is in securing all
testimony which will help in ascertaining the truth. In Brooks, 79
the defendant planned to testify, so this state interest was not
in need of advancement. While the state in Brooks had an
interest in preventing perjury, the possibility of perjury was
merely speculative.
If the Lakeside and Griffin opinions differ merely because,
on balance, the competing interests of the state and the indi-
vidual mandated one answer in the first case but a different
answer in the second, the implications of Lakeside are still not
entirely clear. The fact situation in Griffin involved comment
by both the trial court and the prosecution. Comment by the
prosecution, of course, imposes a greater cost upon the de-
75. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403 (1955).
77. 406 U.S. at 607.
78. 435 U.S. at 347 n.8.
79. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
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fendant than does comment by the trial court. The prosecutor
is, after all, an adversary and can be expected to be less re-
strained in his comment than would an impartial judge." Al-
though Professor Bruce argued that the trial court will see to
it that the prosecutor's comments will be reasonable,8' it can-
not be denied that the possibility of abuse is present. If the
balance is to be struck, who is to say that it should not be
struck in favor of all comment by the restrained and impartial
trial court and no comment by the zealous and partisan
prosecution?2 This would be no less consistent than Lakeside
with the Griffin holding.8 3 It is only for the Court to say, and
at this point it is no longer clear how the Court would rule on
such a question.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted in vain to find a clear distinction
between Lakeside and Griffin, based upon the consistent appli-
cation of fifth amendment principles, which would justify the
differing results in the two cases. Rather than signaling the
overthrow of the Griffin principle, however, Lakeside was
found to represent the application of a process of balancing the
competing interests of the state and the individual consistently
with the dictates of the fifth amendment.
The problem with a process of balancing is that it is never
clear just where the balance is to be struck. There are at least
four possible results of such a balancing process: (1) allowing
no comment of any kind; (2) allowing a Lakeside instruction
but not allowing a Griffin instruction; (3) allowing a Griffin
instruction but not allowing a Griffin comment by the prosecu-
tion; and, (4) allowing any type of comment. There are also
distinctions to be drawn between comment by the trial court
and comment by the prosecution, with possible distinctions
between them as to the cost imposed. 4 If the distinguishing
criterion is to be merely the cost imposed upon the defendant,
80. See, e.g., the text of the prosecutorial comment in note 43 supra.
81. Bruce, supra note 21, at 231.
82. Such is the rule in England. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36,
§ 1(b), reprinted in 9 HALISBURY, STATUTES OF ENGLAND 613 (2d ed. 1949). Such was
the rule in Connecticut prior to the Griffin decision. State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 34,
174 A. 181, 183 (1934). See Clapp, supra note 20, at 551, 555 n.59, 556 n.64.
83. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. at 344 n.3:
84. See, e.g., Bloom, The California Experience, Griffin v. California, 51 CAL. ST.
B.J. 376 (1976). See also Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 723 (1967).
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how is that cost to be measured? Without a guiding principle
consistently applied, no final answer can be expected. At any
given time, the balance will be struck wherever the nine Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court think it should be struck.
YERACHMIEL E. WEINSTEIN
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-Ancillary Jurisdiction
-Independent Grounds of Jurisdiction Required for
Plaintiff's Claim against Third Party Defendant. Owen
Equipment &'Erection Co. v. Kroger, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978).
Within the last fifty years, and especially since the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction has been greatly expanded by the inferior federal
courts. Importantly, this evolution has occurred in the absence
of specific direction from the United States Supreme Court.
Indeed, prior to the recent decision of Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger,I the Court had last directly addressed
a question regarding the permissible scope of ancillary jurisdic-
tion2 in 1926 in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.3 Owen's
primary significance is that it (1) directs that jurisdictional
statutes be interpreted narrowly and (2) delineates a rather
ambiguous three part test in cases involving questions of ancil-
lary jurisdiction.4 While a possible interpretation of Owen is
that two of the factors involved in this latter test-logical de-
pendence of the federal and nonfederal claims5 and the loss of
a party's legal rights-are to be required only of plaintiffs, in
the author's judgment the better view is that either factor
should be required of any party to a lawsuit asserting a claim
requiring ancillary or pendent jurisdiction.6 Although the full
1. 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978).
2. This statement follows the distinction between ancillary, pendent and pendent
party jurisdiction which has been developed by the inferior federal courts. Owen,
however, makes fairly clear that there are no "principled" differences between the
three doctrines. Thus, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (pendent
jurisdiction), and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (pendent party jurisdiction),
may properly be viewed as addressing the question of ancillary jurisdiction. Neverthe-
less, Owen is the most comprehensive pronouncement on the matter to date.
3. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
4. See text accompanying notes 23-39 infra.
5. A nonfederal claim is one as to which there are no independent grounds of
jurisdiction. A federal claim has such grounds.
6. See text accompanying notes 39-42 infra.
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